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. Grain production had failed to rise significantly in four of the years since 1962 but never in the past decade had world production declined. The decline of 36 million tons in a single year put 1972 world production some 70 million tons below the ten-year trend. Production had risen 338 million tons from 1961 to 1971 for an average gain of 33.8 million tons per year.
The drop in food production in Russia was by far the most critical factor in world grain markets. Russia's reported gross output of grain and pulses in 1972 was 168 million tons, compared with 181.2 million tons in 1971 and 186.8 million tons in 1970. Potato production also dropped sharply-from 92.7 million tons in 1971 to 77.8 million tons for 1972, and sugar and sunflower production also fell to recent low levels.
India and China experienced smaller but still significant shortfalls in grain output. India's 1972-73 harvest (including the wheat crop of early 1973) did not exceed 96 million tons of grain, 18 million tons below target. Grain production in China was officially reported to have fallen some 10 million tons below 1971. Australia had her wheat supplies for export cut in half, and Argentina, South Africa, and the Middle East also suffered crop losses. In the rice belt of Asia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos-all were unable, for a variety of reasons, to meet the needs of their populations from their own production.
As a result, world grain trade rose from 106 million tons in 1971-72 to 130 million tons in 1972-73, and internal stocks have been drawn down to rock-bottom levels in virtually all importing and exporting countries.
EXPORT PRICING IN A SELLER'S MARKET
The U.S. Department of Agriculture did not appreciate the significance of these developments in world grain production despite widespread public and private reports, beginning in February of 1972, of serious crop difficulties in the USSR. This failure led to a period of bizarre export pricing in July and August 1972 after Russian grain purchases had begun. With wheat sales to the USSR reported near 10 million tons by early August, with total wheat exports authoritatively projected at 1.1 billion bushels or more, and with other exporters known to have been virtually out of the market for months because of large sales or short crops, USDA continued until September 22 a subsidy policy that priced wheat for export at levels that had been established in the buyer's market prevailing during the previous year. This policy probably added slightly to the physical volume of wheat exports, and contributed somewhat to increases in U.S. prices. The principal effect of the subsidy policy, however, was to waste some $300 million in public funds, and to lose about the same amount in badly needed export earnings.
PRODUCTION OF OILSEEDS AND PROTEIN MEALS
Oilseeds and protein meals exhibited the most spectacular price movements of all the farm commodities in 1972 and 1973. The demand for protein meals is tied closely to the demand for meats and poultry, since the meals are essential to efficient conversion of grains into meat. Strong demand, therefore, had kept prices of oilseeds and protein meals at fairly high levels in the 1971-72 season, and had reduced carryover stocks to minimum levels in all countries. The March 15, 1972, price of $120 for a ton of soybean meal was already high by earlier standards; a year later, the price was $250, and it rose to over $400 at the peak in the summer. World grain and oilseed shortages and high prices have interacted with the cyclical and short-term movements of cattle, hog, and poultry production in the United States. In 1972 cattle raisers were marking time on marketings, but were building their herds for future expanded production. Hog producers reacted late in 1971 and in 1972 to low prices a year or so earlier, and reduced output. Both these sectors faced record high feed costs by the late summer of 1972, thus limiting any tendency farmers and feeders may have had to feed to heavier weights to take advantage of high meat-animal prices. Broiler and egg producers are even more sensitive to feed costs, and cut back production especially in response to protein meal prices.
But that is not the whole story. Policy makers have known about the de-veloping meat shortage for several years but have failed to act in a timely way to use the nation's extensive land resources to expand basic cattle herds so essential to future supplies at reasonable prices. As early as 1963, Congress was asked to provide authority in the feed grain program for the secretary of agriculture to permit land diverted from crops to be used for grazing. This authority was granted, but only for emergency use on an area or county basis. In the Agricultural Act of 1970, Congress authorized unrestricted use of set-aside (diverted) acreages for grazing or for production of hay, but the administration neglected to use the authority until it was faced with the present emergency in the fall of 1972. Use of set-aside acres for cattle production will not expand beef output materially for at least two years, but it is definitely constructive and should be continued.
GOVERNMENT POLICY DECISIONS
The strong demand for meat, poor 1972 harvests, and a pervasive worldwide inability to expand the output of protein meals enough to stabilize prices largely explain the price increases of late 1972 and of 1973. A number of policy decisions were taken to temper the buoyant price movements. But chaotic decision making with respect to planning for 1973 harvests contributed to a psychology of scarcity which has dominated U.S. and world markets for grain and oilseeds for twelve months.
Measures to augment supplies included, first, sharp reductions in reserves of grains. Stocks of the Commodity Credit Corporation were sold and federal grain loans to farmers were terminated. As the 1973-74 crop year began, CCC had literally no grain reserves with which to limit price increases or to meet other emergencies. Second, the suspension of beef import quotas was continued and dairy product imports were increased. Third, export subsidy payments on wheat, rice, lard, poultry, and tobacco were ended late in 1972. And, finally, administrative actions restricted agricultural exports under P.L. 480, barter, and the CCC credit programs. Instead of limiting increases in the prices of raw materials (corn, wheat, soybeans) by means of export licensing, and relying on competition and profit restrictions to limit the rise in meat, poultry, and egg prices, the President froze the latter while crop uncertainties and record export demand drove summer grain prices to record levels. These developments squeezed actual or potential feeding margins, threw the industry into confusion and uncertainty, and brought on the chaos of July and August in the food markets. As a result, the increase in the food component of the consumer price index for August was 6 percent. That places the retail food price increase for 1973 at about 20 percent in eight months, or an annual rate of 30 percent.
Food prices will rise further during late 1973 and early 1974, as ceilings end and pass-throughs are initiated, as grain prices remain high by any standard except that set in July and August, and as reduced pork and egg supplies-the legacy of the summer's uncertainty-become apparent. For the calendar year, I stay with my estimate of a few months ago: a 25 percent rise in retail food prices from December 1972 to December 1973.
